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Abstract
An investigation of a sample of potential carry-trades for a number
of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States exhibits similar characteristics to the build up
of macroeconomic financial instability as presented by Hyman Min-
sky. The trade is generally profitable relative to funding costs and
measured against a stock index investment benchmark. As with the
Financial Instability Hypothesis, when conditions in the international
financial system are calm, returns for the carry trade are highest and
subject to less risk than the occasions when international uncertainty,
risk aversion or political and economic worries about the investment
currency are high. The nature of the risk that is taken when investing
in the carry-trade strategy helps to explain the frequent deviations
from uncovered interest parities that have been found in the literature
and adds to the understanding of the nature of the risk associated
with financial instability.
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1 Introduction
The carry trade is the attempt to take advantage of deviations from uncovered
interest parity (UIP). UIP is one of the fundamental theories of international
financial economics. UIP asserts that, given the free flow of capital, the
expected change in an exchange rate over a specific period should be equal
to the interest rate differential for the two currencies for the same period.
If this is not the case, there is an opportunity to make an abnormal return,
using the carry trade, by borrowing one currency and investing the proceeds
in the other. A large body of evidence and the activity of speculators, who
it appears trade on information, suggests that UIP does not hold.
In the carry trade, speculators are betting that the depreciation of the in-
vestment currency against the funding currency will be less than the interest
rate differential. There are two main explanations for why the carry trade is
so popular1: there may be an inefficiency in the markets processing of infor-
mation that will allow abnormal returns to be generated by this investment
approach; there may no inefficiency and the returns that are achieved may
be a compensation for taking an unusual type of risk. It has been shown that
speculation is unlikely to be completely uninformed. This chapter assesses
the latter with an investigation of the nature of carry trade returns. These
returns are found to be leptokurtic (or fat-tailed), negatively skewed, serially
correlated in many cases, affected by the type of currency regime and sen-
1The discussion of the carry trade and its size or significance rises and falls. It has often
focused on specific countries such as Turkey, Iceland, the Czech Republic where interest
rates are unusually high and on funding currencies like the US dollar, the Swiss Franc,
Euro and Japanese Yen where interest rates are relatively low and a developed banking
system is ready to provide funding for investors searching for higher yields. However, there
are no figures on the size of the activity.
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sitive to changes in international risk aversion. The evidence suggests that
the returns to the carry trade are not abnormal but a return for taking crash
risk that is characterised by unpredictable large losses that increase with the
length of the period running up to the crash.
In this way, the carry trade can be seen as being a micro version of Min-
sky’s Financial Instability Hypothrsis (FIH) While Minsky presents a story
where there is a gradual build up of speculative borrowing, increased fragility
then a crash, carry trade positions are likely to be built while conditions are
calm; the establishment of carry trade positions appear to generate abnormal
returns as the purchase of the investment currency will tend to cause it to
appreciate rather than depreciate; the carry trade itself will start to gener-
ate crash risk as the appreciation of the investment currency takes it further
away from equilibrium which can increase the risk of crash and ensure that
any crash that happens is deeper and more damaging than would otherwise
be the case. In this way the carry trade receives a compensation for taking
crash risk. However, the carry trade also causes an increase in the amount
of crash risk.
This paper assesses carry trades in Europe. There are a number of con-
ditions that make Europe a very fertile ground for this activity: there have
been periods when there have been relatively large interest rate differentials
between some countries; there are a number of fixed exchange rate regimes;
there is a divergence between very highly developed financial systems in the
core and less developed systems to the periphery. These are all features that
encourage the establishment of carry trade positions. However, it is very
likely that the results established here would be applicable to other parts of
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the world.
Europe is also a good place to start with some analysis of speculative
activity in the foreign exchange market because there is a rich history of
speculative activity in European foreign exchanges. From the successive de-
valuations of sterling under the Bretton Woods system through to the crises
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) into some of the monetary prob-
lems that CEE countries have faced when they have tried to stabilise their
exchange rates, European nations have sought to limit effects of speculation
on their economies. Most recently a version of the carry trade has caused
some problems in Europe as it has led to led to large capital flows into those
countries with relatively high rates of return within the Euro area (like Greece
and Spain).
2 Literature
UIP takes the form,
E[St+j]− St
St
=
(it,j − i∗t,j)
(1 + i∗t,j)
(1)
Where E[St+j] the expected value of the exchange rate (S), defined as
overseas units of domestic currency, at time t for j periods ahead, it,j is the
domestic interest rate at time t for j periods ahead and i∗t,J is the equivalent
for the foreign currency denominated interest rate.
There is no carry trade if this holds as the gain from borrowing a lower
interest rate currency and depositing in a higher yielding unit will be ex-
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pected to be balanced by a capital loss on the depreciation of the investment
currency against the funding unit. However, the evidence from Froot and
Thaler (Froot, 1990) and others suggests that UIP does not hold on average.
Estimating the β1 from Equation 2
∆st+j = β0 + β1ft+j + ε (2)
finds that the value is usually much lower than the value of one that would
be implied by UIP. Indeed, the fact that the carry trade exists shows that
there are investors who believe that they can identify the times when UIP will
not hold. As UIP is based on notions of rationality and arbitrage and a key
component of international financial theory, there has been a tremendous
effort to understand more about this apparent failure. (Engel, 1996) and
(Roll and Yan, 2000) suggest that it is the lack of stationarity in the series
that causes estimation problems; (Bansal and Dahlquist, 1999) argue that
this is more a problem for developed rather than developing nations; (Chinn
and Meredith, 2004) report that this is more of a short-term issue than one
for the long horizon as they carry out tests using 10 year bond yields.
2.1 Risk Premium
If the assumption that investors are risk neutral or indifferent to risk is aban-
doned in favour of risk aversion there will be a risk premium to compensate
investors for taking risk. The interest differential will be equal to the ex-
pected change in the exchange rate plus an additional premium for taking
the risk of an adverse outcome. In that case the negative estimate for β could
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mean that investors required additional return for holding foreign currency
assets. As such, it is possible to augment Equation 2 with an additional term
that would account for the risk premium.
E[∆st+j] = β0 + β1ft+j + β2rpt + ε (3)
This means that the expected change in the exchange rate is equal to the
forward discount or the interest rate differential plus a risk premium. If the
forward rate ft+J is five percent below the spot rate st+j, because the interest
rate differential (it+j− i∗t+j) is five percent in favour of the overseas currency,
the expected appreciation of the domestic currency E[∆st+J ] should be five
percent and β1 and β2 should therefore sum to one otherwise there is a
breakdown of UIP and an opportunity for the carry trade. If β1 is below
zero, β2 must be equally positive, indicating that an additional return is
required for taking the risk of making an overseas investment. This seems
entirely reasonable until it becomes clear that there are many cases where
domestic interest rates are higher than those abroad and the carry trade will
involve borrowing overseas for a domestic investment. UIP does not hold in
these cases and now there is a risk premium for holding domestic assets and
the argument breaks down. There may, of course, just be a return for taking
risk, but the return to the carry trade appears excessive compared to the risk
premium in other financial assets.
Bilson addresses this and other factors that may drive a wedge between
the forward rate and the expected rate by considering speculative efficiency
which is efficiency once risk premia, transaction costs and information costs
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have been been accounted for. He finds the optimal investment strategy and
tests it under a variety of specifications, including out of sample, finding
that there are no other factors that can add to the forecasting ability of the
forward rate (Blison, 1981).
However, as the risk premium is not observed, the model is not identified
unless some additional restrictions are imposed.
rpt = fdt + ∆s
e
t+j (4)
By using surveys of expectations, from the Economist Financial Report
for the period June 1981 to August 1988, Froot is able to isolate the effect
of the risk premium by using the survey to estimate ∆set+j. The survey mea-
sures reveal that abnormal returns are expected on foreign currency deposits
when US interest rates are low and these expectations do not usually include
a risk premium. Where there does appear to be a premium it is very small.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3 Footbote, survey evidence is not partic-
ularly reliable or comprehensive and the analysis of the risk premium as an
explanation of the forward bias puzzle has continued.
Indeed, Froot also shows that short rates consistently predict excess re-
turns on a variety of assets. For foreign exchange, stock, bond and commod-
ity markets, a one percentage annualised increase in the short term interest
rate is associated with about a three percentage point reduction in annu-
alised excess returns (Froot, 1990). There could also be a liquidity issue that
is not formally addressed by Foot. If low interest rates are symptomatic of
money creation in the banking system from lending that is being used to pur-
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chase assets, this can lead to lead to short run appreciation of assets values.
This would be consistent with the Minsky-type behaviour where informed-
speculators push asset prices beyond levels associated with intrinsic value,
raising the risk of a violent reversal once the liquidity spigot is turned off.
2.2 Expectations
There are two related questions that need to be addressed: are expectations
about future exchange rates formed in a fashion that can be considered ratio-
nal ; and, what is the information set on which these expectations are formed.
In the analysis conducted thus far, expectations are assumed to be rational in
the sense of Muth (Muth, 1961), meaning that economic agents understand
the model that describes the system and that therefore there are no system-
atic expectational mistakes (see Section for further discussion on rational
expectations). This means that, as described above, if UIP describes the
relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate, economic agents
form their expectations by this rule.
The so-called peso problem came from an analysis of the Mexican peso
and implies that when there are expectations about a future, discrete change
in fundamental value, rational forecast errors may be consistently different
from zero. For example, if there is considered to be a 5% chance of a 50%
devaluation of a fixed exchange rate, the expected depreciation of 2.5% will
never actually be seen. This raises a series of questions about how far eco-
nomic agents can be expected to form subjective probability estimates of
future events that match the objective probabilities as suggested by (Muth,
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1961, p. 316). There is a lot of evidence to suggest that this is not possible.
See Section for a discussion of rational expectations and Section for more
detail of behavioural theories of decision-making that indicate that there is
particular difficulty with the assessment or estimation of the probability of
events that are extremely unlikely (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
It is also possible that expectation could be formed on wider informa-
tion set than the sample of exchange rate returns that were available to
researchers. If market participants fear a large, future depreciation of an ex-
change rate (say the Mexican peso, which is the example most initially used
to explain the Peso Problem), the fact that this is a rare or even unique event
means that these expectations may not be recovered from the historic sample
of the Mexican peso. Rogoff looked at the Mexican peso futures from June
1974 to June 1976 and found evidence contrary to the implications of market
efficiency but explained by the market’s persistent belief that the Mexican
peso would be devalued. The peso was devalued in August 1976 and again in
December 1994 (Rogoff, 1980), (Lewis, 2008). Therefore, expectations were
proved right even though pre-devaluation research would find a problem.
This may lead back to risk. An explanation that is partially explored
by Froot and Thaler is that assessing risk by the first two moments of a
distribution is inadequate in a situation where returns are not expected to
be normally distributed. There are steady returns from a long Mexican peso
position funded by US dollars, but also large and uncertain risks that are very
difficult to quantify. Small risk of extreme inflation and large depreciation of
the peso would not be balanced by any similar possibility of an appreciation
of the Mexican unit and therefore the distribution of inflation expectations
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is very likely to show a large negative skew (Froot and Thaler, 1990, p. 186).
2.3 Crash risk
There are a number of recent studies that have assessed the skewed nature
of the returns that are associated with the carry trade. For example, Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen develop a general model of what they call crash risk
which is due to the sudden unwinding of carry trade. The crash happens
when risk appetite and funding liquidity decreases. They use exchange rates
for the US dollar against eight major currencies for the period 1986 to 2006
and the three month interest rate to assess the returns for an investment in
foreign currency financed by domestic (US) currency.
zt+1 ≡ (i∗ − i)−∆st+1 (5)
where zt+1 is the return in excess of the prediction of UIP as i
∗ is the log
of the overseas three month interest rate and i is the domestic three month
interest rate and ∆ss+1 is the change in the log of the exchange rate mea-
sured as foreign currency per US dollar (Brunnermeier et al., 2008, pp. 8-9).
They find that carry trades have large Sharpe Ratios, negative skewness and
positive excess kurtosis. However, as the Sharpe Ratio assumes a symmetric
distribution of returns, there are some clear weaknesses in this method.
Brunnermeier shows how this crash risk can be increased by the interac-
tion of institutional features like illiquidity, margin calls and the evaporation
of speculator funding. When conditions deteriorate, investors seek to exit the
carry position, liquidity declines, banks become more cautious about fund-
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ing speculative positions and an increase in margin requirements, together
with a reduction in funding lead to spirals of selling and exaggerated price
movements (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
Gabrisch and Orlowski carry out an investigation of equity markets,
money market rates and exchange rates in some CEE countries using a mean
version of the general auto-regressive conditional hetroscedasticity model
with a generalised error distribution (GARCH-M-GED) to assess the na-
ture of the disturbances in these time series. Inflation targeting countries of
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Romania are assessed with a sample
from January 3 2000 to August 7 2009. The study finds that there is evidence
of leptokurtic disturbance for each of these financial variables with the GED
parameter significantly below the level of two that would be associated with
a normal distribution. They argue that this type of behaviour of financial
assets makes the operation of a Taylor Rule for monetary policy inoperable.
It is clear that fat-tailed, negative-skewed distributions are a common feature
of CEE financial markets. Indeed, it appears that foreign exchange shocks,
such as the effects of the carry trade, translate across other financial markets
(Gabrisch and Orlowski, 2011).
Spronk, Vershoor and Zeinkel use a hetrogenous agent model with carry
traders in addition to fundamental and chartist traders. This is an augmen-
tation of the model of fundamental and chartist traders that is presented
by (Frankel and Froot, 1990) where fundamental traders expect a return to
fundamental value and chartists expect a continuation of the trend. Traders
adjust their strategy towards those that are most successful. The model is
able to replicate the heavy tails, excess volatility and volatility clustering
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that is evident in foreign exchange rates. Another interesting feature of this
model that suggests a link with Minsky’s FIH is the negative relationship
between market volatility and carry trade activity (Spronk et al., 2013). The
carry trade is built while conditions are calm.
Variants of the carry trade are a key component of capital flow in emerging
economies with fixed exchange rates. Korinek assesses the welfare implica-
tions of capital flows from the stance of externalities. These externalities
emerge due to the failure of agents to account for the systemic risk that is
created by capital inflow. Korniek says that emerging markets may appear
to be integrated into international markets but this integration is contingent
upon financial constraints not being binding. Private agents fail to internalise
the endogenous nature of the access to international financial markets. This
risk is a function of the build up of foreign currency debt and the amplified
potential for a feedback loop to exacerbate capital outflow, exchange rate
depreciation and the reduction in the overseas value of domestic collateral
and ability to service debt. In other words, there are carry trade participants
that fail to fully appreciate the crash risk that they are taking.
Korniek proposes a tax to internalise these external risks and suggest
different levels of tax for different types of capital inflow based on the proba-
bility of future capital outflow. This puts the largest tax on foreign currency
debt and the smallest on foreign direct investment flow. Korniek argues that
the risk of capital outflow changes over time with the greatest risk after a
period of high capital inflow and the lowest risk after a period of re-balancing
(Korinek, 2011)
In order to try to quantify the value of this crash risk, Jurek has tried
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to quantify the expectations of something like a catastrophic risk that may
be apparent in UIP by looking at the price of options that could be used
to hedge potential crash in the exchange rate. He asserts that the common
finding that carry trades generate excess returns is misleading because these
returns are a compensation for risk. Though he finds that G10 carry trades
for the 1990-2008 period generate Sharpe Ratios that are twice the level of
the S&P 500 equity returns, Jurek estimates that these generally disappear
once the cost of option hedging of crash risk is included (Jurek, 2007). This is
consistent with the notion that any returns to the carry trade (see Equation
5) are a compensation for taking crash risk rather than abnormal or excess
return.
2.4 European financial markets
There are two main types of speculative activity associated with the carry
trade that have been found in the European foreign exchange markets. The
first is that conducted by professional carry trade investors, taking advan-
tage of the break-down in UIP and apparently well aware of the risk that
they are taking; the second are regular households that are attracted to the
trade by the incentive of a low level for foreign currency interest rates. Do-
mestic households are a significant, less well informed component, and, in
most cases, less able to absorb the sort of losses that can occur in extreme
periods. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Transition Report for 2010 called Recovery and Reform puts an emphasis on
the need to develop local currency capital markets as a critical part of the
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post-crisis reform agenda as a means of reducing macroeconomic, financial
and personal risk (Berglof, 2010). Developing a theme from the 2009 report,
the EBRD highlight the credit boom that developed in many CCE and CIS
states from the early part of the current century and the cost involved in min-
imising the disturbance caused by the outflow of capital and the downward
pressure on the exchange rate. The report showcases the fact that foreign
currency loans account for more than 50% of the total advances in many CEE
and CIS countries. The exceptions from the group of countries considered
in this paper are the Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. When loans are
broken down by maturity, it is clear that, possibly due to uncertainty over
the long term value of units, the share of foreign currency increases with the
length of the loan.
The main reason for domestic institutions use of foreign currency debt
is that it appears to be cheaper than the domestic alternative (Focus on
European Economic Integration: Foreign Currency Loans, 2011, p. 32 - 33).
However, the EBRD report also discusses the disconnect that seems to exist
between the private benefit of borrowing in foreign currency and the social
cost that is created by the increased risk of financial dislocation. If this
excessive borrowing of foreign currency debt is the result of a mis-pricing of
risk, there is a role for government regulation to facilitate improvement. It
is clear that there are some reasons why this speculative activity is rational
individually but in total it creates costs in terms of crash risk that are born
by society.
A study of foreign currency borrowing and bank balance sheet by Brown
and De Haas was used by the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
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velopment (EBRD) to show that higher foreign currency deposits, higher
interest rate differentials and lower foreign exchange volatility were associ-
ated with higher levels of foreign currency borrowing. This is consistent
with the idea that the opportunity for foreign currency borrowing, perceived
opportunity cost and short-term risk profile are amongst key factors that en-
tice domestic agents to borrow in overseas units (Brown and De Haas, 2010).
These factors will form the starting point for the carry trade model that is
developed here.
3 Methods
3.1 The carry sample
A full assessment of the carry trade in CEE and CIS countries is impossi-
ble without information about the positions that have been taken and the
returns that have been achieved by international speculators and domestic
households and firms. This private information is not available. It appears
that no database or private permissioning of this type of data has been made
available. However, a sample of possible carry trades can be constructed
from information about exchange rates and interest rates that were available
over the period under consideration. This is the method that was adopted
in (Brunnermeier et al., 2008) and presented in Equation 5. The aim is to
get a sample that is representative of the potential for the carry trade and to
use this to establish how the profits from this speculative activity evolve over
time. Finally, a model of carry trade profits will be used to better understand
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the factors that encourage the establishment of carry trade positions and the
risks that are being taken.
The spot exchange rate and deposit rates for 1 month and 3 months were
collected from the Thomson-Reuters 3000 Xtra system for the major CEE
and CIS countries and for some other important European countries that
have been prominent in the carry trade. The Icelandic Krona (ISK), the
Norwegian Krone (NOK) and Turkish Lira (TUK) are generally regarded
as being carry trade candidates and will be used as one benchmark against
which to test the other countries. The selection was based on the availability
of data. Slovakia and Slovenia were excluded because they have already
joined the euro. Lithuania and Serbia were not included because there is a
lack of deposit data. The data are end of month rates (the closing rate on
the last day of the month).
The US dollar, the euro, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen were used
as funding currencies. Habib and Stracca have tried to assess the funda-
mentals of low yield, safe haven or funding currencies and have concluded
that the net external asset position, the size of the stock market and, in some
cases, the interest rate spread are the key feature indicating external stability,
financial development and the presence of the carry trade for developed coun-
ties respectively (Habib and Stracca, 2012). The funding currencies chosen
for this study fulfill these basic criteria.
One issue that arises with the use of monthly data is whether this creates
a bias in the results. However, an examination of daily exchange rate and
interest rate data does not suggest any seasonal pattern that would cause
end of month rates to be systematically different from the average. One way
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to deal with this would be to use daily data in the calculation. However, the
higher the frequency, the more likely that measurement error or the bid-ask
spread will affect the findings.
3.2 A carry trade model
There are a number of factors that can be assumed to influence carry trade
activity and the performance of the trade itself. Section 2.4 has an overview
of the findings of (Brown and De Haas, 2010) which identify the exchange
rate regime and the interest rate spread as being the key factors behind the
participation of households in the carry trade. In Section 2.3 (Brunnermeier
et al., 2008), (Spronk et al., 2013) and others have found that international
risk aversion is an important feature in reducing the prevalence of the carry
trade. This study seeks to build a model that has three main components: the
exchange rate regime, the interest rate spread and a measure of international
risk. These factors will then be used to understand more about carry trade
risk and return.
3.3 Exchange rate regime
The nature of the exchange rate regimes is an important factor that can
affect the performance of the carry trade. A fixed exchange rate can be an
invitation to conduct the carry trade if there are interest rate differentials,
particularly if the monetary authorities make a pledge to maintain the ex-
change rate. A flexible exchange rate means that there is much greater risk
for the participant in the carry trade and therefore less carry activity is likely
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to be seen in these circumstances. The IMF classifies exchange rate regimes
according to a range of rigidity running from a currency board through a
fixed peg or crawling peg to a fully floating exchange rate (IMF, 2009). (IMF
Classification of Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Frameworks, 2004 to
2009). This classification can be simplified into three broad groups within
the countries under study: those that have a permanently fixed exchange
rate through the whole of the period (denoted group one), those that are
fixed initially but gradually loosen the ties as the period progresses, or vice-
versa (denoted group two) and those that largely allow the exchange rate
to fluctuate (denoted group three). The group categorisation is next to the
country name. This categorisation will be used throughout the study.
3.4 Risk and uncertainty
Risk and uncertainty are a central theme and were discussed in detail in
Section The carry trade is closer to that part of risk that is quantifiable
and these calculations will be presented here. However, there is also a very
important element that is uncertain: when will the crash happen? As has
been seen from the analysis of the informational content of speculation in 3,
this is not very easy to discern. In order to increase the amount of information
that is used to detect the the times when the risk of a crash has increased,
carry trade participants are likely to take a large interest in the actions
of others. They will use this observation to assess what information the
others have: if they are involved in the trade, they are likely to be acting
on information that encourages them to believe that conditions will remain
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Table 1: IMF Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks
1994 - 2010
Country Currency Regime (1994) Regime (2008) Reference
CEE/CIS
Bulgaria (1) BGN Currency board currency board EUR
Czech Republic (3) CZK Managed float Float EUR
Croatia (2) HRK Managed float Fixed peg EUR
Estonia (1) EEK Currency board Currency board EUR
Hungary (2) HUF Fixed peg Float EUR
Latvia (1) LVL Fixed peg Fixed peg Basket
Poland (3) PLN Float Float
Romania (2) RON Crawling peg Managed float EUR
Russia (2) RUB Managed float Fixed peg Basket
Ukraine (2) UAH Fixed peg Managed float US dollar
Other
Iceland ISK Float Float
Norway NOK Float Float
Turkey TRY Float Float
The categories come from the (IMF, 2009). The data are used as the basis for dividing
the countries into three broad categories of exchange rate: those that have a permanently
fixed exchange rate through the whole of the period under study; those that are fixed
initially but gradually loosen the ties as the period progresses; those that substantially
allow the exchange rate to fluctuate. Countries are allocated to one of three categories
according to whether they have a main fixed exchange rate (1), a mixed regime or
crawling peg (2) and a free float (3).
calm and the carry will remain successful; if they exit carry positions, they
probably have information that suggests that the calm conditions are coming
to an end and the risk to the carry trade has increased.
As a result, one of the chief characteristics of the carry trade is that it
provides a self-fulfilling negation of UIP. However, it is very dependent on
expectations. If financial markets are expected to be calm, the benefits of
the interest rate differential will appear to be most attractive; if uncertainty
increases, doubts about the carry trade can become more prominent as the
probability that a sharp movement in exchange rates could outweigh the
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benefits of the interest rate differential will increase. The more intense the
fear that the investment currency is likely to start appreciating against the
funding unit, the greater the risk that the build up of speculative positions
will be unwound in a cascade that provides a self-fulfilling crash.
There are a number of ways that expectations about the future may be
affected: a change in the exchange rate regime; a market induced change in
the value of the exchange rate; an adjustment in economic fundamentals that
makes it more or less likely that there will be a large change in the exchange
rate. The first means that political events are important, particularly those
that could represent a change in government or policy. This is most acute
when there is a fix rate or a crawling peg as any change is likely to result
in a significant discrete adjustment such as that associated with the peso
problem (see Section for a more complete discussion). The other cases mean
that the broad range of influences on the exchange rate have to be continually
monitored when the currency is allowed to float.
A second strand of uncertainty that is likely to affect the carry trade flows
from the level of risk aversion or risk appetite in the international financial
system. Increased uncertainty about the future, meaning that there is a
perception that knowledge is less precise, is likely to lead to caution of the
type identified by Keynes in his assessment of uncertainty and the liquidity
premium (Keynes, 1936, p. 148, p. 240). This caution is likely to affect
not only those in the specific exchange rate market but also those in the
periphery and related markets. For example, as risk aversion rises generally,
the cost of funding speculative positions is likely to increase (in terms of
interest payment and margin requirement), funding currencies are likely to
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appreciate due to safe-haven effects and more risky, high yield and emerging
currencies may suffer a tendency to weaken, even before carry trades are
unwound. The unwinding of the carry trade accelerates the process.
This chapter will concentrate primarily on the international disturbances
to expectations and the rise in international risk aversion. This is likely to
have a two-fold effect: it will cause some unwinding of carry positions and it
may also cause some flight-to-quality for funding currencies. As an extension
of this work, measures of domestic disturbance could be included. These
could try to capture changes in domestic political conditions or changes in
domestic risk aversion. For example, the yield spread between domestic and
core bonds, the price of credit default swaps or opinion polls of support for
governing parties could be used.
3.5 Measuring international risk aversion
The measure of international risk aversion that will be used in this study
is the VIX index. VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options
Market Volatility Index. This is an index of one month implied volatility
on the S&P 500 stocks. See (Chicago Board of Trade, 2009) for full details
on the method of calculation.2 The VIX is the square root of the S&P 500
variance over the next 30 days. The VIX is quoted in annualised standard
deviation. This translates into the annualised expected movement in the
S&P 500 in the next 30 days. When the index increase, implied volatility
has increased, presumably because demand for options has risen relative to
2See (Brenner and Galai, 1989) for initial thoughts on the construction of volatility
index. (Diamond, 2012) shows that the VIX index is the volatility of a variance swap.
(Demeterfi et al., 1999) gives additional details of the pricing and use of volatility swaps.
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supply. It is believed that the increase in the demand for options, given that
this is most likely to happen when fund managers want to protect against the
risk of a sharp movement in equity prices, is a sign of increased uncertainty,
concern about the future or risk aversion.
shows the performance of the VIX index through the period under study.
It also shows the 90th and 60th percentiles which are used to determine pe-
riods of Crisis and Moderation respectively. These levels are chosen because
intuitively they seem to be reasonable levels to associate with the terms
Crisis and Moderation and by using Figure 1 to ensure that they are not
dominated by specific periods. The 90th percentile of VIX reading for the
period January 2000 to September 2010 is just above 32 while the sixtieth
percentile is just over 23. The first means that market expectations, drawn
from options prices of the constituents of the S&P 500 index, are that the
volatility of the S&P 500 will be above an annualised 32% or 32%/
√
12 = 9.2
percentage points over the coming month, meaning that, if the distribution
of returns are normal, the returns should be could be up to plus or minus
9.2% in 68% of the time. For the period of moderation the same calculation
is for an expected monthly range of less than 6.6% on the same basis.
In this study, during periods of moderation, it is expected that carry trade
positions will be built up, while during the crisis it is more likely that they will
be unwound. More broadly, this is also the pattern that would be expected
to be seen in the whole economy. Minsky’s FIH asserts that it is the periods
of calm that encourage speculative lending to increase and the crisis that
initiates a sharped, skewed reversal. In this way the carry is a micro-version
of the FIH and the drivers and consequences of this speculative activity are
22
Figure 1: The VIX index and critical thresholds used in the study
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likely to provide very good pointers to the drivers and consequences of the
speculative activity at the macro level.
There are a number of other indicators that could be used in place of
the VIX index. These would include the spread between the top rated AAA
bonds and the non-investment grade BBB bonds, one of the emerging market
bond indices, implied volatility on some other financial instruments or even
the level of speculative positions in some US futures contracts (where there
is data availability from the CFTC). The aim in all these cases would be to
establish an objective or quantifiable measure of international risk aversion.
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4 Results
4.1 UIP test
As a starting point of the investigation, a standard test of whether the for-
ward rate provides an unbiased prediction of the future exchange rate is
made. The forward rate is constructed from exchange rate and deposit data
for 1 month and 3 month rates against all the funding currencies. This is
based on the assumption that CIP holds. For example the 1-month forward
rate of the Hungarian Forint against the EUR would be calculated as
EURHUF f1mt =
(1 +HUF1Mt)
1
12 × EURHUFt
(1 + EUR1Mt)
1
12
(6)
where EURHUF f1mt is the 1 month forward rate for euro in terms of
Hungarian Forint at time t, HUF1Mt is 1 month Hungarian Forint deposit
rate, EUR1Mt is the 1 month Euro deposit rate and EURHUFt is the
current rate of Euro in terms of Hungarian currency.
There is confirmation of the deviation from UIP through the period that
is being studied. The test of the unbiased forward rate (Equation 2) records
an estimate for β2 that is below one in six of the ten CEE equations against
the US dollar and for eight of the ten CEE and CIS against the Euro. The
second column of Tables 2 and 3 identify those cases where the t-test of the
restriction on unity for the coefficient is rejected at conventional statistical
levels.
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4.2 Carry trade tests
In addition, a profit series is calculated based on conducting the carry trade
using each of the CEE and CIS sample currencies. The calculation is based
on an investment that borrows in the funding currency, exchanges these units
for the higher yield currency and then converts back to repay the funding
at the end of the month or the end of three months respectively. Therefore,
it is assumed that there is an open position that maintains the risk that
exchange rate movements will enhance or offset the interest rate pick up.
For the calculation of a normalised one month carry trade involving the
Hungarian Forint using the Euro as the funding currency, the calculation is
P1MEURHUFt =
(1 +HUF1Mt)
1
12 × EURHUFt
(1 + EUR1Mt)
1
12 × EURHUFt+1M
(7)
where HUF1Mt is the 1 month Hungarian Forint deposit rate at time t,
EUR1Mt is the 1-month euro denominated deposit rate at time t, EURHUFt
is the exchange rate in terms of Hungarian Forint required for one euro at
time t and EURHUFt+1M is the spot rate in 1 month’s time. This is fun-
damentally the same as Brunnermeier’s, which is Equation 5 (Brunnermeier
et al., 2008). The value of P1MEURHUF is one when uncovered interest par-
ity holds and the relatively higher interest rate in Hungary is exactly offset
by a depreciation of the Hungarian currency against the euro over the course
of the month. Carry trade positions speculate that the depreciation in the
exchange rate will be less than the interest rate differential or positive carry:
values of P1MEURHUF above 1 show a gain on the month, values less than
1 show a loss. A reading of 1.01 is a 1% gain for the month and a reading of
25
.99 is a 1% loss for the month.
4.3 Risk adjusted return
Though the nature of the carry trade suggests that the assumption of normal,
symmetric returns should be questioned, a Modified Sharpe Ratio (MSR)
can be computed to make some initial and rather cautious comparison of the
return to the carry trade compared to the return that is available on other
assets. The MSR is calculated as a simple comparison of return per unit of
risk, assuming that the risk free rate is zero so that returns are calculated
from the break-even point.
26
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample One Month Carry Trade against the US dollar
Country Coefficient Mean Standard
Deviation
Modified
Sharpe
Ratio
Skew Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
Bulgaria (1) 0.9854 1.0024 0.0318 0.0755 -0.0182 4.2100* 1.1018 0.8956
Estonia (1) 0.9684* 1.0049 0.0319 0.1536 0.0429 4.2328* 1.1054 0.9036
Latvia (1) 0.9522* 1.0033 0.0274 0.1204 0.0580 6.7653* 1.1137 0.9009
Croatia (2) 0.9750* 1.0058 0.0315 0.1841 -0.1471 3.9846* 1.0863 0.8973
Romania (2) 0.9173*** 1.0080 0.0342 0.2339 -0.3948* 6.0664* 1.1193 0.8682
Russia (2) 0.9303*** 1.0023 0.0232 0.0991 -1.5591* 14.6058 1.0840 0.8648
Ukraine (2) 0.9808 1.0021 0.0302 0.0695 -3.3897* 23.5276* 1.0981 0.7971
Czech (3) 0.9818 1.0071 0.0377 0.1883 -0.1857 3.5011* 1.1076 0.8826
Hungary (3) 0.9636 1.0077 0.0426 0.1808 -0.8653* 6.2039* 1.1209 0.8183
Poland (3) 0.9577** 1.0074 0.0408 0.1814 -0.6905* 4.8083 1.1046 0.8554
Norway (3) 0.9751 1.0043 0.0333 0.1291 -0.3425* 4.2913* 1.0801 0.8756
Iceland (3) 0.9715 1.0050 0.0473 0.1057 -0.7531* 7.6745* 1.1908
Turkey (3) 0.7960* 1.0122 0.0542 0.2066 -1.0979* 7.4436* 1.1473 0.7576
S&P 500 0.9977 0.0474 -0.0485 -0.5081* 3.5923* 1.0935 0.8289
Countries are classified according to (1) generally fixed exchange rate or currency board; (2) Crawling peg or liberalisation of the exchange
rate regime during the period of study; (3) largely floating. The classification is based on the IMF IMF Classification of Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 2004 to 2009 see Table 1 for fuller details. The ”Coefficient” column is the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimate of the β1 coefficient from the evaluation of equation ∆st+j = β0 + β1ft+j + εt, where ∆st+j is the change
in the spot exchange rate over j periods ahead, ft+j is j-period forward rate, εt is an error term and β0 and β1 are coefficients to be
estimated. The statistical significance of β1is assessed with conventional t-statistics where *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels
of statistical significance respectively. The other columns show the descriptive statistics for the profits from a carry trade calculated as
P1MEURHUFt =
(1+HUF1Mt)
1
12×EURHUFt
(1+EUR1Mt)
1
12×EURHUFt+1M
. The Modified Sharpe Ratio is calculated as the mean return per unit of risk assuming that
there is a constant risk-free rate and that the breakeven point is the reference against which returns are judged. Skewness and kurtosis are
measured in the conventional way with significance calculated as cases where the test statistic is greater than two standard error of skew
(ses) or two standard errors of kurtosis (sek) respectively and identified by an asterisk when beyond this point.
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From Tables 2 and 3, the MSR reveals that for positions funded against
the US dollar, a carry investment in Romania has the highest return for unit
of conventionally measured risk at 0.2339 per month compared to 0.2066
for Turkey and 0.1883, 0.1841, 0.1808 and 0.1814 for the Czech Republic,
Croatia, Hungary and Poland respectively. When funding against the Euro,
the Czech Republic and Hungary have ratios of 0.1751 and 0.1780 respectively
while Iceland is at 0.1639. Croatia, Poland, Romania and Estonia are not
far behind.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample One Month Carry Trade against the Euro
Country Coefficient Mean Standard
Deviation
Modified
Sharpe
Ratio
Skew Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
Bulgaria (1) 0.5425*** 0.9999 0.0024 -0.0417 -0.1397 4.1821* 1.0061 0.9917
Estonia (1) -
0.34798***
1.0004 0.0023 0.1739 0.2811 3.0352 1.0064 0.9952
Latvia (1) 0.9677*** 0.9989 0.0121 -0.0909 -0.8626* 7.8075* 1.0413 0.9411
Croatia (2) 0.8153*** 1.0016 0.0109 0.1468 -1.0107* 6.2748* 1.0260 0.9523
Romania (2) 0.9733* 1.0039 0.0253 0.1541 -0.0625 3.5665 1.0761 0.9284
Russia (2) 0.9687* 0.9987 0.0282 -0.0461 -1.8364* 11.3095* 1.0522 0.8367
Ukraine (2) 0.9872 0.9985 0.0396 -0.0379 -1.0945* 8.0828* 1.1096 0.7969
Hungary (3) 0.8866*** 1.0042 0.0236 0.1780 -0.8433* 7.3652* 1.0734 0.8908
Poland (3) 0.9433*** 1.0042 0.0292 0.1438 -0.5596* 0.4968 1.0770 0.9124
Czech (3) 0.9812 1.0031 0.0177 0.1751 -0.4826* 4.2841* 1.0465 0.9460
Norway (3) 0.8966*** 1.0011 0.0202 0.0545 0.0266 7.6811* 1.0975 0.9210
Iceland (3) 0.9819*** 1.0007 0.0427 0.1639 -0.8212* 8.3528* 1.1727 0.8273
Turkey (3) 0.9291 1.0077 0.0556 0.1384 -0.7185* 6.2073* 1.1890 0.8273
S&P 500 0.9977 0.0474 -0.0485 -0.5081* 3.5923* 1.0935 0.8289
Countries are classified according to (1) generally fixed exchange rate or currency board; (2) Crawling peg or liberalisation of the exchange
rate regime during the period of study; (3) largely floating. The classification is based on the IMF IMF Classification of Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 2004 to 2009 see Table 1 for fuller details. The ”Coefficient” column is the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimate of the β1 coefficient from the evaluation of equation ∆st+j = β0 + β1ft+j + εt, where ∆st+j is the change
in the spot exchange rate over j periods ahead, ft+j is j-period forward rate, εt is an error term and β0 and β1 are coefficients to be
estimated. The statistical significance of β1is assessed with conventional t-statistics where *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels
of statistical significance respectively. The other columns show the descriptive statistics for the profits from a carry trade calculated as
P1MEURHUFt =
(1+HUF1Mt)
1
12×EURHUFt
(1+EUR1Mt)
1
12×EURHUFt+1M
. The Modified Sharpe Ratio is calculated as the mean return per unit of risk assuming that
there is a constant risk-free rate and that the breakeven point is the reference against which returns are judged. Skewness and kurtosis are
measured in the conventional way with significance calculated as cases where the test statistic is greater than two standard error of skew
(ses) or two standard errors of kurtosis (sek) respectively and identified by an asterisk when beyond this point.
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Evidence from the sample one month carry trade show that in all currency
cases there is an expected positive return when funded against the US dollar
(see Table 2). Against the Euro the outcome is more mixed. On average a
loss is made when depositing funds in Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine and Latvia.
An analysis of the results shows a range of returns on carry trade funded
by the US dollar from 1.0080 for Romania to 1.0021 for the Ukraine, or
0.8% per month (around 10% annualised) and 0.2% per month (around 2.5%
annualised). These returns compare quite favourably with the more well
known carry countries like Norway, Iceland and Turkey where the sample
returns over this period are 1.0043, 1.005 and 1.0112 (0.43%, 0.5% and 1.1%
respectively. The 1% average return on a US dollar funded investment in
Turkish deposits is the most favourable in this sample. This would give
just a little more than 14% annualised return. The others are 5% and 6%
respectively. These returns also compare favourably with the sample return
available on the S&P 500 index which made an average loss through the same
period calculated on the same funding process.
For the positions funded by the Euro, Polish and Hungarian positions
achieve a mean return of 0.42% (just over 5% annualised). This is just a
little less than the 0.77% (nearly 10% annualised) achieved for a Turkish
carry position but more than the 0.11% and 0.07%for Iceland and Norway
respectively. There are average losses for deposits made in Bulgaria, Russia,
Ukraine and Latvia. See Table 3. The positions for carry trades funded
by Swiss francs (not reported but available on request) show average carry
profits for Czech, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Estonia (as well
as Norway, Iceland and Turkey). For carry trades funded by the Japanese
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yen, all the carry positions are profitable on average.
In conclusion, the preliminary investigation shows that UIP generally
does not hold for the main CEE and CIS exchange rates during the period
under study and it appears that there are returns from investing in the carry
trade. The question of whether these returns are sufficient to compensate
for the risk that is being taken will be investigated in the next section by
building a carry trade model and using that to understand more about the
nature of the risk and return.
4.4 A carry trade model
The aim of this section is to build a model to explain the carry trade and to
use this to learn more about the profits and risk associated with the activity.
As was identified in Section 3.2, the main components of the carry model
should be the exchange rate regime, the level of international risk aversion
and the interest rate differential. Given the assumption that calm conditions
will encourage carry trade positions to be established and that this will tend
to mean that the carry trade is successful by the encouraging appreciation
of the investment currency at the expense of the funding currency, it may be
suspected that there will be some momentum behind the carry trade and that
an increase in profits for the carry trade will encourage other participants to
enter the market.
The initial assessment of the carry trade is carried out with simple or-
dinary least squares (OLS)3 using the profits from the carry trade as the
3There is likely to be some bias to the estimates of the coefficient on the lagged de-
pendent variables as a result of using this method and therefore the results should be
31
dependent variable and using the lag of the dependent variable, the VIX
index and the spread between the interest rates in the investment and fund-
ing currencies. The carry trade should benefit from calm conditions and,
when these are in place, carry positions are likely to be gradually built. This
would suggest serial correlation in the profit series would be seen in periods
of calm. Changes in the VIX index are designed to capture adjustments in
international risk preference that should make the carry trade less attractive.
Therefore, lower levels of the VIX are associated with calm and the building
of profitable positions; higher levels of the VIX should be associated with
reversals, as carry trade positions are unwound, negative profits, increased
liquidity constraints and a rise in risk aversion amongst investors and funders
of the position, and an increased probability of crash risk. The interest rate
differential makes the carry trade attractive in the first place and provides a
greater buffer against a depreciation of the investment currency against the
funding unit. Therefore, the greater the interest rate differential the greater
the expected profit and the greater the crash risk that should be expected.
The equation to be estimated is
yit = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + ε (8)
where yt is the return to the carry trade for country I at time t, x1 is
the lag of the dependent variable, x2 is the VIX index and x3 is the interest
rate differential; β0, β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients to be estimated. The
treated with some caution. In an estimation of yt = a + b1yt−1 + et, E(yt, et) 6= 0. The
bias will disappear asymptotically so long as there is no serial correlation in the residuals.
Therefore, the inspection of the residuals is most important in this case (White, 1961).
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results of the investigation are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The VIX index
is statistically significant and negative in each case. There is mixed evidence
on serial correlation. Russia, Ukraine and Iceland show signs of momentum
behind the carry trade that could indicate a build up of risky positions. In
Croatia, Latvia and Estonia, there is evidence of negative feedback. This
may be a function of the natural fluctuation within an exchange rate band.
There may be mean-reversion to the centre of the band when the exchange
rate is fixed. Interest rate differentials have a positive effect in all cases, but
it is not always statistically significant. As would be expected, the more fixed
the exchange rate, the more important the interest rate differential appears
to be for the carry trade. An interest rate differential will encourage the
building of carry trade positions when the exchange rate is fixed.
There are surprisingly few differences in the results of funding with the US
dollar compared to funding with the Euro. Russia and the Ukraine, where the
exchange rate is more referenced against the US dollar, show quite a strong
influence from the interest rate differential on the profitability of the carry
trade when funded against the US unit, but this disappears when assessing
the interest rate differential with the Euro; the more fixed the exchange rate,
the more interest rate differentials are important, the more variable, the more
international crisis affects the profitability of the carry trade. The more fixed
the exchange rate the more the interest rate differential is important.
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Table 4: Influences on the carry trade funded by US dollars
Country Exchange
Rate
Regime
Auto-
regression
VIX Rate Spread
Bulgaria (1) 0.0243 -0.0005 0.0027*
Estonia (1) -0.0134 -0.0009** 0.0044**
Latvia (1) -0.1618 -0.0008*** 0.0034***
Croatia (2) -0.0477 -0.0007* 0.0021**
Romania (2) 0.0033 -0.0011*** 0.0004*
Russia (2) 0.3420*** -0.0007*** 0.0011**
Ukraine (2) 0.2504*** -0.0016*** 0.0018***
Hungary (2) 0.0058 -0.0012*** 0.0028**
Czech Republic (3) 0.0138 -0.0009** 0.0030
Poland (3) -0.0013*** 0.0010
Turkey (3) 0.0947 -0.0013*** 0.0003
Iceland (3) 0.1838** -0.0009* 0.0000
Norway (3) 0.0792 -0.0010** 0.0032*
These are the coefficients on the equation yit = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + εt,
where yit is the profit from the carry trade at time t, X1 is the lag of the
dependent variable, X2 is the VIX index of implied volatilities on the S&P 500
index, X2 is the 1-month interest rate differential between the currency and the
funding unit (US dollars). β0, β1 and β2 are coefficients to be estimated. *, **
and *** signify that the estimated coefficients are significantly different from
zero using t-statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.
4.5 Moderation and Crisis
The FIH postulates that there are periods of calm, during which speculative
positions are built as shocks become increasingly difficult to imagine. How-
ever, these calm conditions and the build up of speculative positions that
accompany them create the conditions under which the potential for a large
crash is increased. The carry trade appears to have a very similar pattern.
Indeed, it could be considered a micro version of the FIH. Therefore, this
study will assess whether the carry trade can be characterised by two dis-
tinct periods: the calm or moderation when speculative positions are build;
34
Table 5: Influences on the carry trade funded by the Euro
Country Exchange
Rate
Regime
Auto-
regression
VIX Rate Spread
Bulgaria (1) -0.2603*** 0.0000 0.0010***
Estonia (1) -0.4639*** 0.0000 0.0010***
Latvia (1) 0.0571 0.0000 0.0014***
Croatia (2) -0.1684* -0.0010 0.0009*
Romania (2) 0.0645 -0.0007*** 0.0004*
Russia (2) 0.1715* -0.0002 0.0000
Ukraine (2) 0.1074 -0.0010** 0.0007
Hungary (2) 0.0746 -0.0006*** 0.0021**
Czech Republic (3) 0.0294 -0.0004** 0.0038*
Poland (3) 0.1966** -0.0008*** 0.0011*
Turkey (3) 0.0358 -0.0010** 0.0000
Iceland (3) 0.1087 -0.0008 0.0002
Norway (3) -0.0256 -0.0003 0.0004
These are the coefficients on the equation yit = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + εt,
where yit is the profit from the carry trade at time t, X1 is the lag of the
dependent variable, X2 is the VIX index of implied volatilities on the S&P 500
index, X2 is the 1-month interest rate differential between the currency and the
funding unit (Euro). β0, β1 and β2 are coefficients to be estimated. *, ** and
*** signify that the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero
using t-statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.
the crisis of panic when positions are unwound. This part of the paper seeks
to understand the nature of returns to the carry trade in these two regimes.
Indeed, underlying this hypothesis, the distribution of returns to the carry
trade can be postulated as having two phases: a relatively tight distribution
about the mean during periods of calm and broad or fat-tailed distribution
with a negative mean during times of crisis. To make a comparison of the
two regimes, the sample carry trades are broken into two categories. The
first is the period calm or moderation and labeled M and the second of crisis
and is labeled C. Using the VIX index as a signal of international crisis the
35
sample is divided into those crisis periods when the VIX is above the 90th
percentile of the whole period under investigation and those calm periods
when it is less than the 60th percentile. The levels are chosen with reference
to the data (see Figure 1) to ensure that there are a sufficient number of
observations in each category and to try to prevent the 2007 - 2008 financial
crisis dominating the period of crisis. On inspection, it is clear that the
recent crisis is important, but there are some representatives from earlier. It
would have been interesting to have used a rolling quantile but the relative
sparsity of data made this unfeasible.
There are a number of themes that emerge from the result of this exercise
(Table 6 for US dollar funding and Table 7 for Euro funding). For US dollar
funding, carry returns in the crisis period are below those in the period of
calm for all cases and in all cases, apart from Bulgaria where results may be
affected by one large discrete devaluation at the beginning of the sample, the
mean return switches from being a profit to being a loss. For Euro funding,
crisis returns are lower in all cases but Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and Iceland
and the mean return again switches from profit to loss. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that carry trades are successfully built in times
of calm and unprofitably unwound in the crisis.
The decline in profitability is statistically significant for Poland, Romania
and Norway when funding with US dollars and Poland, Hungary and Estonia
when funding with Euro. The test used is an F-test analysis of variance
that compares the variability between the mean of the two groups with the
variability of the samples within the two groups modified along the lines of
Welch to compensate for differences in the variance of the two groups (Welch,
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1951). It is not surprising that a floating exchange rate regime is more likely
to encounter significant variation in carry returns.
The second finding is that the increase in international uncertainty and
risk aversion is associated with an increase in in the risk attached to carry
trade profits, whether measured in conventional or unconventional ways. The
standard deviation of carry returns funded against the US dollar is larger in
the crisis period relative to that recorded in the period of calm for all CEE and
CIS countries in this sample. An F-test of the ratio of the standard deviation
of the two return periods (crisis and moderation) is significant in all cases.
It is very likely that this is at least partially a function of the US dollar leg
of the trade becoming more volatile due to international issues. However,
though US dollar funded carry trade with Iceland shows the same pattern
of increased volatility, the increase in the standard deviation of Norwegian
and Turkish crisis returns may be a little larger for the crisis, they are not
statistically significant using the same F-test standard. For Euro funding
of the carry trade, all cases bar Latvia and Estonia show greater risk in the
crisis period. These results should not be surprising given the currency board
arrangements that are designed to minimise the fluctuations in the exchange
rate. The increased volatility for Bulgaria, which also has a currency board,
is associated with the pre-board period. However, only in the case of the
Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russia are difference in variance statistically
significant under the test constructed.
The F-test of standard deviation equality assumes a normal distribution.
As noted in the literature and the initial investigation, this is not likely to
be an accurate description of returns to the carry trade. Therefore, a non-
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parametric test of the return distributions in crisis and calm can be carried
out. The test conducted is the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) rank sum
test. The test will compare the ranks of the two series and the U statistic
U1 = R1 − n1(n2 + 1)
2
(9)
where R1 is the rank of series 1, n1 is the number of observations in series
1 and n2 is the number of observations in series 2. The smallest U statistic
for the two series is chosen. U − 1 is normally distributed in larger samples
with tables for less than 30 observations. A large value for the test statistic
is a general indication that the means, medians or general characteristics of
the two distributions are different in the two samples.
There is consistent and persistent evidence that profitability of the carry
trades is affected by the international crisis and changes in risk aversion.
This is most evident in the countries that allow their exchange rates to float.
It seems that linking to a funding currency will reduce the possibility of ex-
tremely negative exchange rate outcomes, though there may be other mone-
tary costs associated with the implementation of the stabilisation policy.
Using the robust MWW to test whether the distribution of the carry
trade profits in the two regimes are different (identified as an asterisk in the
standard deviation column of Tables 6 and 7), reveals significant results for
Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey with US dollar funding and Hungary,
Poland, Estonia, Norway and Turkey for EUR funding. The conclusion is
that the distribution of returns in periods of calm and moderation in these
cases are not the same, providing support for the hypothesis that carry trades
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can be characterised by two regimes, moderation and crisis, and that the
distribution of carry trade profits for the period of moderation has a high
mean, a compact and symmetric distribution while the mean for the crisis
is lower (probably negative) and the distribution is wide and skewed. The
profits are lower and the risk is higher.
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Table 6: Carry trade vs US dollar: A comparison of Crisis (C) and Moderation (M) modes
Country Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation
Mean Standard Deviation Skew Kurtosis
Bulgaria (1) 0.9869 0.9998 0.0542* 0.0245 0.2119 0.0993 3.0996 2.2825
Estonia (1) 0.9894 1.0019 0.0539*** 0.0237 0.2980 0.1177 3.0854 2.8024
Latvia (1) 0.9893 1.0011 0.0548*** 0.0192 0.5186 -0.2981 3.4178 3,.5784
Croatia (2) 0.9911 1.0033 0.0492*** 0.0239 -0.5192 0.1090 2.5149 3.2016
Romania (2) 0.9780* 0.0118 0.0585** 0.0290 -0.3242** 0.6032 2.2246 4.9414
Russia (2) 0.9799 1.0040 0.0519*** 0.0125 -0.5190** -0.7216 3.3035 5.8705
Ukraine (2) 0.9722 1.0049 0.0787*** 0l0124 -0.8091 1.1037 3.2066 6.5962
Czech (3) 0.9823 1.0046 0.0522** 0.0306 -0.2056 -0.2102 2.5504 2.7822
Hungary (3) 0.9752 1.0079 0.0773*** 0.0342 -0.6404 -0.5227 2.6642 2.6364
Poland (3) 0.9693* 1.0080 0.0669** 0.0330 -0.3928* -0.3027 1.9318 2.8995
Norway (3) 0.9812* 1.0044 0.0593 0.0297 -0.9127 0.2421 2.7733 3.0321
Iceland (3) 0.9937 1.0094 0.1265*** 0.0329 0.4620 0.0329 1.9136 3.0460
Turkey (3) 0.9696 1.0212 0.0725 0.0440 -1.1087* -0.3614 2.9842 6.3445
S&P 500 0.9849 0.9966 0.0899** 0.0367 0.2461 -0.4854 1.3363 3.4212
Countries are classified according to (1) generally fixed exchange rate or currency board; (2) Crawling pego or liberalisation of the
exchange rate regime during the period of study; (3) largely floating. The classification is based on the IMF IMF Classification
of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 2004 to 2009 see table 1 for fuller details. The crisis mode is
identified by the VIX index being above the 90th percentile while the moderation is below the 60th percentile. The test of the
difference in means is an analysis of variance F-test that compares the variability of the means of the two groups with the variation
of the samples within groups, modified along the lines of the (Welch, 1951) for possible differences in the standard deviation of the
samples. The comparison of the standard deviations is based on an F-test of the two variances, the distribution of the profits during
the crisis and moderation periods is compared using the rank test proposed by Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon to produce a U statistic
(noted in the skew column). In all cases the statistical significance of the difference between the two periods at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels is identified by ***, ** and * respectively.
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Table 7: Carry trade vs the Euro: A comparison of Crisis (C) and Moderation (M) modes
Country Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation Crisis Moderation
Mean Standard Deviation Skew Kurtosis
Bulgaria (1) 0.9979 0.9989 0.0037 0.0019 -0.6208 0.0177 2.3408 5.0171
Estonia (1) 1.0023 0.9999 0.0022 0.0020 0.5329*** 0.3551 1.9143 3.9310
Latvia (1) 1.0036 0.9990 0.0106 0.0111 0.1292 0.1126 2.1531 5.5973
Croatia (2) 0.9981 1.0020 0.0143 0.0091 -1.1246 -0.3460 2.9392 4.0375
Romania (2) 0.9886 1.0076 0.0379 0.0227 -0.1564 0.5149 1.3058 3.3333
Russia (2) 0.9755 1.0018 0.0781*** 0.0198 -0.9529 -0.1711 2.6817 3.3539
Ukraine (2) 0.9530 1.0031 0.1130*** 0.0286 0.0877 -0.0538 1.9163 3.0344
Czech (3) 0.9823 1.0026 0.0350** 0.0133 0.1880 -0.1890 1.3283 3.0750
Hungary (3) 0.9656* 1.0070 0.0405 0.0212 -1.1734*** -0.5259 2.9761 5.4320
Poland (3) 0.9520 *** 1.0068 0.0321 0.0263 0.4844*** -0.5970 2.3183 3.3204
Norway (3) 0.9974 1.0032 0.0597*** 0.0169 0.8849* -0.07930 2.9493 3.8786
Iceland (3) 1.0022 1.0072 0.1179*** 0.0284 0.1495 -0.7455 1.8228 4.8749
Turkey (3) 0.9770 1.0193 0.0407 0.0483 -0.1328** -0.2182 1.7780 6.0263
S&P 500 0.9849 0.9966 0.0899** 0.0367 0.2461 -0.4854 1.3363 3.4212
Countries are classified according to (1) generally fixed exchange rate or currency board; (2) Crawling pego or liberalisation of the
exchange rate regime during the period of study; (3) largely floating. The classification is based on the IMF IMF Classification of
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 2004 to 2009 see table 1 for fuller details. The crisis mode is identified
by the VIX index being above the 90th percentile while the moderation is below the 60th percentile. The test of the difference in means
is an analysis of variance F-test that compares the variability of the means of the two groups with the variation of the samples within
groups, modified along the lines of the (Welch, 1951) for possible differences in the standard deviation of the samples. The comparison
of the standard deviations is based on an F-test of the two variances, the distribution of the profits during the crisis and moderation
periods is compared using the rank test proposed by Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon to produce a U statistic (noted in the skew column). In
all cases the statistical significance of the difference between the two periods at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is identified by ***, ** and *
respectively.
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Figure 2: The Distribution of USD Carry Trade Returns in Moderation and Crisis
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The difference in the carry trade profit during periods of moderation and
crisis is very clear when presented graphically with kernel density estimates.
A kernel density estimate is a smoothed histogram. Rather than putting
the data points into a bin, a normal distribution with a mean on each point
is established and these kernels are added together to get a smoothed line.
The size of the standard deviation that is applied to the normal distribution
about the data point is called the bandwidth. There is a trade off between the
establishment of a smooth line with a large bandwidth and the dissipation of
the information that this implies. The default Silverman’s rule of thumb is
used in this case and reported at the bottom of the graph (Silverman, 1986,
p. 48). This analysis is carried out with the density function in base package
in R (R Core Team, 2013) see (Venables and Ripley, 2002) for more details
of the smoothing process.
Figure 2shows the distribution of carry trade returns for Norway (NOK),
Czech Republic (CZK) and Romania (RON) when funded against the US
dollar during the period of Crisis (C) and period of Moderation (M) respec-
tively; Figure 3 shows the distribution of carry trade returns for Hungary
(HUF), Poland (PLN) and Iceland (ISK) against the Euro during the period
Crisis (C) and Moderation (M). The x axis is fixed to ensure clear compari-
son. It is clear that during the times of increased international risk aversion,
the returns to the carry trade are not only lower on average but they are
more dispersed, more negatively skewed and more likely to be losses.
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Figure 3: The Distribution of EUR Carry Trade Returns in Moderation and Crisis
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5 The carry trade and speculation
This chapter has sought to understand more about speculation by looking
closely at one particular speculative activity in the foreign exchange market.
Many of the characteristics of speculation that have already been identified
are evident in the carry trade: there are real effects; there is some information
that speculators take advantage of; there are feedback effects and momentum;
and, there is complexity.
As we have seen in Section there are a broad range of cases where mone-
tary authorities of investment currencies have struggled to contain exchange
rates and inflationary forces when carry trade positions have been estab-
lished. If the exchange rate is fixed, there is a need to purchase overseas
assets, expanding the central bank balance sheet and the monetary base at
a time when domestic banks are full of the deposits of carry trade investors.
If the exchange rate is allowed to float, there is a loss of competitiveness
or pressure to reduce domestic interest rates. In either case, the short-run
impact on domestic demand is likely to be positive through lower import or
funding costs; the long run consequences are likely to be a hollowing out of
domestic industry or asset price inflation. The negative consequences of the
imbalances that have developed are likely to be exposed as a result of the
crash that happens when capital reverses: the exchange rate, interest rates
and asset prices fall; import prices increase, reserves and the monetary base
shrink.
This speculation is based on the widely documented evidence that UIP
does not hold. It is not noise trading. It has been established that the carry
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trade will, on average, be successful. There are funds and individuals willing
to try to take advantage of this apparent inefficiency. Aggressive investment
funds with short-term horizons are continually searching for these sort of
anomalies while regular households can also be seduced by slick sales talk
backed by glossy examples of the savings to be made by overseas borrowing.
The activity is even more attractive if others are participating. The level
of uncertainty over the future exchange rate movements is very high. How-
ever, this is inevitably reduced in currency peg, particularly if the monetary
and political authorities are pledging to fight the sort of depreciation that
is to be feared. For regular households, there is a feeling of safety in num-
bers and it would be foolish to miss out. For more sophisticated investors,
the greatest returns are for those at the start of the trend. Price momentum
helps to further reduce any doubts by ensuring initial success: the carry trade
causes the investment currency to appreciate rather than depreciate and the
central bank may be fighting to keep the exchange rate down.
However, the analysis of the carry trade that has been conducted here
suggests that there are large, unconventional risks associated with the strat-
egy. There is a complexity that is not captured by conventional measures of
risk. There are big risks, they happen rarely and they are not easy to predict.
In addition, if expectations about the future depend so much upon what oth-
ers think, any equilibrium will be fragile. Small doubts can turn complacency
into panic. For institutional investors, there is a need to get out ahead of
everyone else, for households, the risk of personal loss is compounded by the
sense of more general economic crisis.
It has been argued here that the carry trade is a micro version of a Minsky-
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Kalecki-Levy speculative accelerator model where speculative activity and
subsequent reversal are self-reinforcing. Hedge financing that errs towards
speculative financing can mean that increased investment will raise profits
sufficiently to ensure that they are enough to cover all payments. These are
good investments. However, there is a limit to how far this can be pushed.
Diminishing returns from investment will set in, ensuring that the financing
scheme becomes speculative and raising the prospect of crash-risk. With
the carry trade, the trades themselves tend to negate the tendency of the
funding currency to appreciate against the investment currency, increasing
the attraction of the trade and raising the funds devoted to the activity.
However, this will increase the risk if there is a reversal as traders will be
wary of such a turn-around and will be ready to exit, adding to the pressure
for a crash, when it occurs.
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